When Commissioner Marie-Josée Hogue gave a statement following the release of the final report of the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference (PIFI) in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions, many concerned Canadians probably have heard a new term: “transnational repression.”
A genuine scourge
Described by Justice Hogue as a “genuine scourge” to the democratic process, transnational repression (TNR) has now fully come into the limelight, although this shadowy foreign threat has been hurting individuals across Canada, and across the globe, for many years. This phenomenon has been under the radar of civil society groups, human rights organizations and even Canada’s National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) and Canada Border Services Agency for many years.
Transnational repression is one of the most coercive tactics of foreign interference. Foreign governments, authoritarian or with illiberal tendencies, target Canadians and temporary residents through surveillance, harassment, physical and digital threats, and even murder.
As a nation with many diaspora communities, Canada is a primary target of autocratic leaders who wish to coerce, control, intimidate, and silence their nationals abroad, specifically political opponents, journalists, activists, religious and ethnic minority groups, international students, and members of diaspora. It should come as no surprise that the key threat actors for Canada are China, Russia, India and Iran, but small countries such as Rwanda and Eritrea should not be overlooked.
Transnational repression takes many forms, direct and indirect, physical and digital. In 2022, the organization Safeguard Defenders revealed that the PRC had deployed 110 illegal overseas police stations in 30 different countries. Montreal, Vancouver and Toronto are among the cities where such clandestine stations were found. University campuses are also a primary targeted as they host many international students. The Chinese government is particularly active on campuses through Chinese students’ groups.
The murder of Singh Nijjar
One of the worst recent cases of transnational repression was certainly the murder of Hardeep Singh Nijjar in Surrey in 2023. Despite denials by the Indian government, then Prime Minister Justin Trudeau accused Prime Minister Narendra Modi Modi’s government of the killing of the Sikh leader, an affirmation corroborated by Canadian and U.S. intelligence services. A similar assassination plot was uncovered a few months later in the New York. Abroad, other examples include the assassination of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul and the assassination of Rwandan dissidents and political opponents in Mozambique.
While transnational repression is not new, the phenomenon is emblematic of the geopolitical and technological era we live in. It is yet another tactic employed by authoritarian leaders to undermined human rights and democracy beyond their borders. TNR is also inseparable from globalization and technological advancements as states can control their nationals beyond their own physical frontiers, even moving into the cyber sphere. Indeed, technologies such as smartphones, social media, and malware render extraterritorial repressive activities cheaper, more intrusive, and harder to detect.
The impacts of TNR on targeted individuals, their families, diaspora communities, human rights and democracy are profound. As Mehmet Tohti, executive director of the Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project, told the PIFI Commission: “It touches your life. It touches your safety. It touches your security. It touches your family comfort. It touches your career. It touches your future.” Known as the chilling effect, this sense of fear and insecurity that can lead individuals to self-censor and isolate themselves.
The psychological consequences are also dire, especially in the digital era. Since phones have also become a tool on transnational repression, victims have nowhere to hide from harassment and surveillance. Through spyware secretly installed on a target’s smartphones, such as the Pegasus spyware developed by the Israeli cyber-arms company NSO Group, surveillance is undetected and all-invasive.
Many targets cut off ties with their families for fear of putting them at risk as threatening family members has become a common tactic, one especially used by China. Some like Pierre-Claver Nkinamubanzi, Rwandan dissident and president of the Canadian Rwandan Congress, even decide to no longer have contact with their own children in Canada in order to protect them from harm.
More generally, TNR has a chilling effect on political and social engagement in the host country. Many targets of TNR who thought they could continue their activism here, are faced with the reality that this is not the case. As Yuriy Novodvorskiy, President of the Russian Canadian Democratic Alliance testified at the Commission, TNR or even fear thereof has led some members of the Russian diaspora to disengage from politics. Political apathy has an impact on Canadian democracy.
Transnational repression has now fully come into the limelight, although this shadowy foreign threat has been hurting individuals across Canada, and across the globe, for many years.
Canada’s response then and now
Canada response to transnational repression leaves much to be desired. Victims of transnational repression have complained about the lack of support from the government and Canadian authorities. Mr. Tohti told the Commission that he reported to the Ottawa Police, the RCMP, CSIS, the Minister of Public, and Global Affairs but believes that nothing has been done.
The list of problems is long. First, the duplication of reporting mechanisms is confusing. Public Safety Canada indicates individuals can contact the RCMP, CSIS, Canadian Centre for Cyber Security or even border services but it is unclear whom to contact in which situation. Second, victims of TNR who used the CSIS hotline did not get systematic call backs, creating frustration. Recognizing the current weaknesses reporting mechanisms, the Commission’s report recommended a centralized, easy-to-use reporting hotline and better follow-up with those who report incidents.
Other problems include the lack of transparency among the intelligence community, lack of resources dedicated to foreign influence and TNR, lack of cultural and linguistic knowledge among staff, and lack of long-term engagement between diaspora communities and Canadian authorities, to the detriment of mutual trust.
Revelations by Global News about foreign interference in the 2019 and 2021 elections, along the Hogue Commission, appear to have been a wake-up call for the government and elected officials. First, Bill C 70, known as the Countering Foreign Interference Act, was passed into law in June 2024 and “aims to counter foreign interference by modernizing the CSIS Act, updating the Security of Information Act, and creating a foreign influence registry (…)”. Ensuring that the foreign influence transparency registry is put into practice is essential for safeguarding Canadians from acts such as transnational repression.
The government also created the National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator “to coordinate efforts to combat foreign interference.” Should this position be sufficiently resourced and visible, it could become an important tool of engagement with diaspora communities. Reciprocal and long-term engagement is needed to combat TNR, but both the government and authorities must fully commit to the relationship.
Tackling threats to the international rules-based system requires countries to work together. Through the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, Canada is taking more concrete actions to put transnational repression on the agenda. In February 2025, Global Affairs Canada convened experts, government officials, academics, and representative of diaspora groups for the G7 Dialogue on Transnational Repression, a two-day meeting that sought to identify concrete steps G7 governments can take to protect our societies from the reach of governments who seek to extend repression abroad.
Conclusion
Canada, as an open multicultural society, is especially vulnerable to transnational repression. The government has a duty and responsibility to take a more proactive and muscular approach in protecting Canadian citizens and temporary residents. From policy and legal measures to community engagement and international cooperation, there is much more that Canada must do to not only make up for lost time but also take a leadership role in tackling foreign influence and transnational repression.
As human rights and democracy no longer seem to be a priority of the Trump administration’s foreign policy, Canada can fill the void. At the G7, the new Carney government has an opportunity to send a strong signal not only to all Canadians and targets of transnational repression here and abroad, but to autocratic governments who wish to destroy democracy and human rights.